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ABSTRACT 
Over five decades have passed since the triumph of Fidel Castro’s guerrilla army in the 
revolution that removed Cuba’s dictator Fulgencio Batista. Since then, the Cuban 
Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, FAR)—with roots in 
the revolutionary movement—has redefined its role and missions several times up to the 
current regime. This thesis explores how the FAR has adapted to mission changes from 
the end of the revolution to the post-Cold War period (1959–Present) while remaining 
loyal to the revolution. The FAR’s commitment to the state and subordination to political 
leaders is particularly interesting now with its most recent mission shift into 
entrepreneurship. This thesis, finally, seeks to analyze the extent of political influence the 
FAR has exercised and explore potential linkages between shifts in political power and 
mission change. First, the thesis will chronologically explore the development and 
progression of the FAR as an institutional actor, paying particular attention to the 
militarization of the Cuban economy. Second, the implications of all these changes are 
placed in context by exploring the FAR’s power dynamics with other political 
institutions. Lastly, it will assess the importance of the domestic dimension of the FAR 
and the contributions to the Cuban economy against the relevance of the Cuban 
Communist Party (PCC). 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Over five decades have passed since the triumph of Fidel Castro’s guerrilla army 
in the revolution that removed Cuba’s dictator Fulgencio Batista on December 31, 1958. 
Since then, the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, 
FAR)—with roots in the revolutionary movement—has redefined its role and missions 
several times up to the current regime change that is moving Cuba away from 
totalitarianism in a “process of post-totalitarianism by decay, societal conquest, and 
partial reluctant liberalization.”1 In terms of the FAR’s mission changes, from the 1970s 
to mid 1980s, the FAR shifted from its initial focus of defending the country against 
possible invasion to a commitment to exporting revolution through international 
missions. Subsequently, during the late 1980s, the FAR withdrew from its foreign 
military forays, and, facing budget and personnel cuts, fuel and spare part shortages 
directly and indirectly caused by the loss of Soviet aid, training and equipment, the 
FAR’s role reverted to national territorial defense; a shift coupled with the creation of the 
Territorial Troop Militia (MTT) as a way of compensating for the FAR’s readiness 
degradation. This new branch of the FAR consisted of volunteers charged with defending 
their respective municipalities in case of an external invasion by the United States. The 
FAR once again shifted its role and missions following the conclusion of the Cold War, 
when the FAR assumed a critical role in the domestic economy under the Cuban state’s 
perfeccionamiento empresarial initiative, an “official policy to guide the full 
restructuring of the Cuban state economic system.”2 In accordance with this new 
program, the FAR was granted control of the sugar and tourism sectors. This thesis 
explores how the FAR has adapted to mission changes from the end of the revolution to 
the post-Cold War period (1959–Present) while remaining loyal to the revolution. The 
FAR’s commitment to the state and subordination to political leaders is particularly 
                                                 
1 Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 10. 
2 Domingo Amuchastegui, “FAR: Mastering Reforms,” Cuba in Transition: Volume 10, Papers and 
Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy 
(ASCE), Coral Gables, Florida, August 5, 2000, 433. 
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interesting now with its most recent mission shift into entrepreneurship. The FAR’s 
incursion into the domestic economy is in direct conflict with the legacy of socialist 
doctrine and has the potential to advance independent capitalist ambitions that may 
deviate from the regime’s domestic and foreign policy direction. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
This thesis seeks to contribute to scholarship and help understanding future 
political and economic developments in Cuba. In terms of its scholarly value, the thesis 
attempts to bridge studies covering different stages of the FAR’s mission trajectory, 
research on institutional cohesion, professionalism, and discipline within the FAR, and 
studies of civilian control of the armed forces.  
In terms of its predictive power, the study discusses the expectations about the 
future role of the FAR in Cuban politics as the country undergoes a regime change. For a 
regime whose longevity is directly dependent of the armed forces’ loyalty to the ruling 
coalition, it is important to understand how obedience to the revolutionary rule was 
achieved and sustained. Furthermore, it is also essential to comprehend previous state’s 
rules of accountability for the FAR and the implications of enforcing subordination in 
terms of the FAR’s cohesion and institutional integrity. Of particular concern is whether 
the FAR’s economic interests and political power will slow the transitions to more open 
political and economic practices on the part of the government.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis addresses the lack of chronological continuity in literature that 
explores the development and progression of the FAR as an institutional actor from the 
revolution until the post-Cold War period in terms of civil-military relations and 
connections between military missions and civilian control of the FAR. Over the years, 
the missions of this institution have changed in response to the pressure exerted by the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the priorities set by the Castro brothers. Across its many 
changes in missions, the institution has remained a critical actor in politics. This thesis, 
finally, seeks to analyze the extent of political influence the FAR has exercised and 
explore potential linkages between shifts in political power and mission change. 
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Following the revolution, the FAR evolved and emerged from being a rebel army 
to a professional military oriented toward the defense of national sovereignty from 
foreign invasions on Cuban territory. Subsequently, intent on propagating Marxist ideals 
throughout the region, the FAR undertook a new mission or that of a defender of Marxist-
Leninist revolution on the international stage. This shift occurred during the Soviet 
withdrawal immediately following the Missile Crisis (1962). The FAR turned to 
sponsoring Cuban-backed rural insurgencies overseas as means to gain allies in the 
region and beyond. With military victories in Ethiopia (1977–78) and Angola (1975–76, 
1987–88), the FAR’s capacity to project power overseas was unique within Latin 
America. In particular, the FAR’s Angolan campaign to establish the Popular Movement 
for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) as the Angolan government is considered one of its 
“most significant accomplishments in foreign policy.”3  
The FAR’s evolution and expansion from a guerrilla force to the national and 
legitimate armed forces present many exceptional features in civil-military relations. The 
lack of a political party capable of hegemonic direction at the time the FAR toppled the 
Batista regime fused the guerrilla elites from the 26th of July Movement into the new de-
facto political class and the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) “was created inside the FAR 
with the political instructions that the military leaders remained the number one source of 
leadership and authority.”4 In terms of political control over the military as defined by 
Samuel Huntington, Cuba’s initial policies cannot be catalogued as either “objective”5 or 
“subjective.”6 While the FAR developed into a highly professional force, it has never 
been politically neutral. Moreover, diverging from literature that suggests that the 
relationship between the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) and the FAR ranges from 
                                                 
3 “Country Profile: Cuba,” Library of Congress – Federal Research Division, September 2006, 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Cuba.pdf, 3. 
4 Domingo Amuchastegui, “Cuba’s Armed Forces: Power and Reforms,” Cuba in Transition: Volume 
9, Papers and Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban 
Economy (ASCE), Coral Gables, Florida, August 12–14, 1999, 109. 
5 Professionalizing the military by rendering them politically sterile and neutral while remaining 
corporately autonomous and responsible for their own expertise. Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the 
State (New York: Vintage, 1957), 84. 
6 Granting authority to a government institution, or to a political party, such as the Communist party, 
over the military. 
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bureaucratically non-conflictive to mutual consent, subjective control mechanisms were 
implemented to assert indoctrination, prevent internal cleavages and ensure obedience to 
the regime by way of political commissars under the Central Political Directorate.7 
Furthermore, the purge of government officials in 1989 and realignment of the Ministry 
of the Interior (MININT) under the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
(MINFAR) increased the FAR’s political power by providing it control of coercion 
hierarchies, communication lines and local officials. The FAR’s role in the political arena 
shares many characteristics of Alfred Stephan’s “new professionalism”8 as far as the 
scope of actions and skills required but the function of the institution has not been 
internal. Security and national development was a later occurrence of the post-Cold War 
reorientation. 
In the 1990s, as the Soviet Union collapsed, Cuba was forced to reevaluate its 
economic model in a period that Fidel Castro referred to as a “special period in time of 
peace” with the intent of defining the economic “hardship of the system which called for 
a new initiative to solve the crisis,”9 caused by the steep drop of imports (particulary oil 
and raw materials) from the Soviet Union coupled with an overall drop of the Cuban 
GDP. The strategies implemented during the “special period” downgraded the military’s 
operational capacity with budget and personnel cuts. Although by law, the role of the 
FAR continues to be the protector of the state, the reality is that the FAR’s mission has 
transitioned to involvement in a variety of domestic purposes in response to the domestic 
economic crisis. Concretely, Cuba’s armed forces refocused their mission to assist the 
government’s effort to retard the decline of the centrally controlled economy by assuming 
control of two of the most important economic sectors: sugar and tourism. During this  
 
                                                 
7 Handbook on the Cuban Armed Forces (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1979), 1–
17, 1–18. 
8 This type of professionalism suggests an interrelationship between military and political spheres, 
“with the military playing a key role in interpreting and dealing with domestic political problems.” Alfred 
Stepan, “The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion,” in Authoritarian 
Brazil, ed. Alfred Stepan (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973), 47–59. 
9 Armando F. Mastrapa III, “Soldiers and Businessmen: The FAR During the Special Period,” Cuba in 
Transition: Volume 10, Miami: Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE), 2000, 428. 
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period, the sugar industry resurrected from the “lowest levels of production in well over 
50 years”10 by increasing production by 1.4 metric tons and tourism emerged as “the 
most lucrative sector of Cuban economy”11 with over 1 million visitors in 2000.  
At the same time, as the FAR has become the “country’s most successful 
capitalist institution,”12 it has also maintained important political power (independent of 
the power it enjoys by running critical industries) through new political roles that include 
filling important policy-making positions with active duty officers and nominating 
candidates to the highest levels of state. Even as the restructuring provided means to the 
FAR officers to protect themselves from the economic crisis by providing privileged 
access to goods and further opportunities of status mobility, it was not received with 
universal approval among its ranks. The discontent is evidenced by the defection of two 
fighter pilots in 1993 and the court martial and execution of Division General Arnaldo 
Ochoa along with three other officers under charges of corruption. These executions, 
however, served as an indication that coercion still played a vital role in the containment 
of dissent from the regime and that military loyalty was not exclusively maintained 
through mechanisms of reward. 
Many scholars, including William Leogrande,13 Amos Perlmutter,14 Irving Louis 
Horowitz,15 Domingo Amuchastegui16 and Frank O. Mora,17 have approached Cuban 
                                                 
10 Mastrapa III, “Soldiers and Businessmen: The FAR During the Special Period,” 431. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Miguel A. Centeno, “The Reinvention of Latin American Militaries.” Americas Quarterly (2007): 
75. 
13 William M. LeoGrande, “A Bureaucratic Approach to Civil- Military Relations in Communist 
Political Systems: The Case of Cuba,” in Civil-Military relations in Communist Systems, ed. Dale R. 
Herspring and Ivan Volgyes (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), 201–218. 
14 Amos Perlmutter and William M. Leogrande, “The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-
Military Relations in Communist Political Systems,” The American Political Science Review (1982): 778–
789. 
15 Irving Louis Horowtiz and Jaime Suchlicki, ed., Cuban Communism: 1959 2003 (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 2003). 
16 Amuchastegui, “FAR: Mastering Reforms,” 433. 
17 Frank O. Mora, “The Far and its Economic Role: From Civic to Technocrat-Soldier,” Institute for 
Cuban & Cuban-American Studies Occasional Papers, Miami, University of Miami Scholarly Repository, 
2004. 
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civil-military relations through the analysis of the relative power of the PCC over the 
military. Their Cuban civil-military relations models suggest relationships ranging from 
neutrality, which is symbiotic to the suggestion of FAR’s dominance models over the 
PCC. This thesis differs by utilizing the pattern of civil-military relations suggested by J. 
Samuel Fitch; hence, analysis is not limited to the PCC’s policy control over the military. 
It also analyzes the influence of the military over the PCC while tentatively subscribing 
to the description of “conditional military subordination” in which the FAR could be 
catalogued as “armed forces that abstain from overt intervention in political 
questions…while it reserves its right to protect national interest and guarantee national 
security in times of crisis.”18 To analyze further the FAR’s influence over policy, the 
framework by Harold Trinkunas is utilized to assess “the boundaries between military 
and civilian jurisdictions.”19 The areas used in this framework are characterized “by their 
functional distance from the military’s war-fighting mission and by the degree of threat to 
civilian control posed by military involvement.”20 The post-Cold War period will be 
analyzed by using Kristina Mani’s analysis of how military entrepreneurship functions 
consider “the level of state capacity and the nature of military organization.”21 
Determining who (regime or the military) takes the initiative in the creation of military 
enterprises determines who will maintain control over the development of such 
enterprises, but more importantly, the level professionalism of the military serves as a 
potential indicator of how those economic gains will be destined to be institutional or 
personal.  
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The objective of this analysis is to assess the relations between the FAR’s 
missions—focusing in particular on its post-Cold War entrepreneurial role—and its 
                                                 
18 J. Samuel Fitch, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1998), 40. 
19 Harold A. Trinkunas, “Crafting Civilian Control in Emerging Democracies: Argentina and 
Venezuela,” Latin American Politics and Society (2000): 80. 
20 Ibid., 80. 
21 Kristina Mani, “Militaries in Business: State Making and Entrepreneurship in the Developing 
World,” Armed Forces & Society (2007): 593. 
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political roles across time. The study involves research using secondary sources on the 
FAR’s military missions across time with particular attention paid to the causal 
mechanisms of change be they domestic in nature or from foreign pressure and the 
implications of these changes on military political power vis-à-vis civilians in the 
government. The factors to be addressed include civil military-relations theory, the 
FAR’s chronological transitions across different missions, institutional cohesion, 
professionalism and discipline within the FAR. To determine how the FAR adapted to 
mission changes, the progression and extent of the country’s reforms are explored from 
the emergence of legitimate armed forces out of a guerrilla group to the post-Soviet 
period. 
FAR’s path to institutional dominance in terms of operational autonomy and its 
record of accomplishment of achieving policy objectives is explored by a chronological 
analysis of its foundation political prerogatives as a source of political leadership and 
current sources of economic clout. This latter theme is illustrated with the analysis of the 
effects of the FAR’s alternative functions caused by the collapse of the party state 
socialism in Easter Europe. The economic restructuring of the financial and managerial 
foundation of major industries in Cuba known as Sistema de Perfeccionamiento 
Empresarial - SPE (official policy to guide the full restructuring of the Cuban state 
economic system22) is examined with particular attention paid to the sugar and tourism 
industries.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter II explores the development and 
progression of the FAR as an institutional actor and traces the FAR’s beginning from a 
guerrilla force to its post-revolutionary expansion and legitimization. Chapter III 
chronologically evaluates the political and economic effects of the collapse of the party-
state socialism in Eastern Europe (Special Period). Chapter IV covers the militarization 
of the Cuban economy and explores strategies addressing the “special period” as they 
have shifted the FAR’s role to a central position within the domestic economy. This 
                                                 
22 Amuchastegui, “FAR: Mastering Reforms,” 433. 
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chapter also examines two important economy sectors, sugar and tourism, and the project 
used towards their economic liberalization (perfeccionamiento empresarial). Finally, the 
implications of all these changes are placed in context by exploring the FAR’s power 
dynamics with other political institutions. Chapter V assesses the importance of the 
domestic dimension of the FAR and the contributions to the Cuban economy against the 
relevance of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) in this post-totalitarian phase of the 
regime. 
 9
II. DEVELOPMENT AND PROGRESSION OF THE FAR AS AN 
INSTITUTIONAL ACTOR 
A. POST-REVOLUTION: FROM REBEL ARMY TO THE FIRST 
INCURSION INTO SOCIO-ECONOMIC MISSIONS  
As Fidel Castro consolidated his government, assumed power, and eradicated 
Batista’s establishment by transferring the duties and summary executions of as many as 
“600”23 former regime loyalists, the Rebel Army assumed its first mission of providing 
territorial defense and maintaining internal security that led to the creation of what is now 
known as the FAR. This initial mission responded to counterrevolutionary forces that 
rose against Castro’s government from 1960–1965.  
Initially, the missions to suppress internal challenges responded to domestic 
insurgents who established themselves in the “Escambray Mountains of Las Villas 
province in central Cuba.”24 Later, the mission against the internal resistance countered 
covert attacks of the United Sates in Cuba, which was the case of the Bay of Pigs, “in 
which some 1,300 CIA-trained Cuban exiles stormed a Cuban beach in April 1961, only 
to surrender three days later.”25 
Externally, the combination of the Monroe Doctrine principle of Latin America as 
an exclusive area of U.S. influence to stop the spread of communism in the Western 
Hemisphere catalyzed the perfect adversarial conditions in Cuba just as Castro declared it 
a “Marxist-Leninist” state.”26 The expropriation of U.S. properties and investments on 
“April 16, 1961,”27 along with the movement of that country toward close relations with 
                                                 
23 Pascal Fontaine, “Communism in Latin America.” in The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, 
Terror, Repression, ed. Stephane Courtois, Nicolas Werth, Jean- Louis Panne, Andrzej Paczkowski, Karel 
Bartosec and Jean-Louis Margolin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 648. 
24 Jorge I. Dominguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1978), 345. 
25 Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington and Africa, 1959–1976 (Chapell Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 2002), Kindle edition, 8. 
26 James M. McCormick, American Foreign Policy & Process, 5th ed. (Boston: Wadsworth, 2010), 
87. 
27 “Country Profile: Cuba,” Library of Congress—Federal Research Division, September 2006, 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Cuba.pdf, 3. 
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the Soviet Union, worsened U.S.-Cuban relations that resulted in a U.S. strategy to 
address the Cuban revolution that ranged from “pressuring Castro toward moderation—a 
difficult challenge—to attempting to eliminate him through military intervention, 
insurrection, and assassination.”28 
Domestically, the regime faced a dramatic increase of insurrection following the 
Bay of Pigs invasion. From March to September 1962, the insurgency bands in 
Escambray nearly doubled in strength ranging from “forty two to seventy nine”29 bands 
during that period. In response to this threat, by July 1962, the FAR had organized the 
first special corps with the mission of fighting the insurgency named “Lucha Contra 
Bandidos, or LCB.”30 The counterrevolutionary forces continued to expand to all six 
provinces and in strength up to “179 insurrectionary bands”31 during the first five years 
of the FAR’s existence. The difference in response against insurrection from Batista to 
Castro was the magnitude of the forces committed. The initial survival of the regime can 
be attributed to a deployment of forces “ten times greater”32 than what Batista utilized for 
similar intensity and amount of fighting. 
Concurrently, during the initial 3-year period (1959–1961), FAR officers 
occupied commanding positions in education, land reform, judicial system and the police. 
As stated in the book from Damian J. Fernandez, “these years marked the entrance of the 
Rebel Army into national life not only as a defense institution but also as an 
administrative arm of the state in spheres such as education, land reform, justice 
(tribunals militares), police functions, and other socio-economic works.”33 This fusion of 
civilian and military functions produced what Jorge Dominguez describes as the “civic 
soldier…men who govern large segments of both military and civilian life…bearers of 
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the revolutionary tradition and ideology…who have dedicated themselves to become 
professional in political economic, managerial, engineering and educational as well as 
military affairs.”34 
1. Preconditions for Internal Cohesion 
The ability of the revolutionary regime to persevere in spite of internal and 
external challenges during the first five years (1959–1963) was due to the FAR’s 
resilience as an institution, administrative capacity, and its loyalty to Castro’s direction. 
The subordination of the FAR to Fidelista control while preserving institutional cohesion 
was achieved through cycles of rewarding loyalty and coercing potential internal 
challenges into submission. 
The foundation of FAR discipline traced back to the insurrection against Batista 
were “minor infractions were dealt harshly,” with punishment that could lead “up to and 
including execution.”35 This foundation of discipline was reinforced with rewards for 
loyalty to Fidel Castro as the commander in chief, and hence, enhanced his control over 
the military. Loyalty was rewarded through appointments to command provinces, key 
installations or government programs and by allowing access to the leaders of the 
revolution, the Castro brothers (Raul and Fidel) and Ernesto “Che” Guevara. 
The opposite side of the control spectrum encompasses the coercion tactics or 
penalties for disloyalty. This process began with the trials of former Batista military 
officials, and as the communist ties to the regime became more apparent, it formalized 
with the trial of Major Huber Matos. 
Huber Matos, a popular Sierra comandante and Army Chief of Camaguey 
Providence, was arrested and imprisoned in 1959 on charges of conspiracy 
against the Revolution. He, along with the other officers who defected 
symbolized the antagonism within the army toward the participation of 
communist sympathizers in the military especially in political education 
posts.”36 
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By 1961, with the introduction of political indoctrination by way of the first cadre 
of 750 graduates of the “Osvaldo Sanchez Cabrera School for Revolutionary 
Instructors,”37 the FAR had developed the preconditions for its internal cohesion. The 
definition of the revolution’s ideology within the FAR narrowed down the political space 
for dissent, which culminated in the conflict developed between political instructors and 
commanders over the guidance along the “correct revolutionary path.”38 As a solution to 
this conflict in 1963, the FAR won the exclusivity of political instruction granted only to 
military personnel, and hence, a political apparatus within the FAR was created. 
The mission of the party in the FAR was to support the institution in the 
execution of its professional responsibilities. As described by Comandante 
Jose N. Causse Perez, then the chief of the FAR’s Political Directorate, the 
party might lead the FAR at the national level, but at the operational level 
its “fundamental mission [was] to aid the chief and the political instructor 
to better carry out the orders, missions and tasks of the unit.”39 
Since party membership became a prerequisite for career advancement in the 
FAR, the FAR representation in the party grew. By 1996, “as many as 90 percent of the 
senior military officers had joined the party and two thirds of the one hundred member 
Central Committee were men who held military rank.”40 
The homogenization of the revolution’s ideology and the prominence of the 
FAR’s officer corps in the party apparatus set the conditions by earning Castro’s 
confidence for a professionalization phase that therefore served as a foothold to the 
FAR’s next mission transition. 
B. PROFESSIONALIZATION AND EXPANSION INTO 
INTERNATIONALISM 
The failure in achieving 10 million tons of sugar production in 1970 served as a 
catalyst for the separation and distinction of roles between the military and the party 
along with Castro’s strategic ambitions. The reduction of the military personnel load on 
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the Cuban economy resulted in a “modern professional small standing force combined 
with an easily mobilized reserve.”41 In other words, as other civilian institutions (to 
include the PCC) increased their capability, the FAR role was initially bound to national 
defense. The FAR’s relief from economic production activities was facilitated with the 
creation of the Youth Labor Army (Ejército Juvenil del Trabajo—EJT) as the latter was 
charged with the missions of a socio-economic development nature. 
During the initial phase of this professionalization period, the military education 
system was improved with the addition of specialized schools, such as the “technological 
institute for military technicians and engineers…the school for administrators of military-
equipment maintenance,”42 among others. However, the most important feature was that 
lower schools fed to higher schools; for example, a great percentage of the graduates of 
the military high school (Camilo Cienfuegos) was admitted to the military technological 
institute. This military school system, in turn, contributed to the ideological hegemony of 
the armed forces. It is also important to mention that the FAR’s rank structure was also 
reorganized during this period to resemble other armed forces around the world. 
Although the professionalization period reduced the armed forces in strength from 
“200,000 personnel… only in four years later the FAR had been cut in half,”43 the 
support (equipment and training) obtained by Raul Castro from the Soviet Union may 
have given Fidel the confidence to change the FAR’s mission from national defense to an 
offensive internationalist role.  
The exogenous pressure sponsoring this mission change can also be interpreted as 
a response to the Bay of Pigs invasion as stated by Gleijeses: 
U.S. hostility spurred Castro to expand his vistas beyond the Western 
Hemisphere: it would have been suicidal to respond directly to the 
American assault-by attacking the U.S. base at Guantanamo, striking the 
U-2s that flew over the island, or providing material assistance to radical  
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groups in the United States. Cuba could strike only in the periphery-in 
Latin America, in Africa, even in Asia. (It offered to send volunteers to 
fight in Vietnam).44 
Thus far, only Fidel or Raul Castro, and until 1965, Ernesto “Che” Guevara, were 
involved in the overall direction of defense policy. Another interpretation argues that 
guided by the post “missile crisis” perception of Soviet Union abandonment, Castro 
resorted to exporting revolution as a means to gain allies in the region and beyond. 
Perhaps better articulated in the CIA’s country study, “If Cuba could no longer count on 
the Soviet Union for its defence, and it still feared a hostile United States, then the 
development of an allied bloc of third world countries, especially in Latin America, 
might have been one way to provide for its defence.”45 Gleijeses’ book, however, 
describes the mission shift from an exclusive agency perspective: 
According to U.S. officials, this “messianic compulsion to lead 
‘revolution’” was one of Castro’s “two basic goals or drives.” The other 
was “the survival of the [Cuban] Revolution”: he was “intent upon making 
it economically viable” and he was “determined to win prestige and 
preserve for Cuba what he conceives of as an independent status.” Quoting 
Castro himself, U.S. analysts noted that he saw Cuba as “a small country, 
attacked, blockaded, against which a policy of undeclared war is being 
followed,” and that he believed that the survival of the revolution 
depended on “‘other Cubas’ succeeding on the continent.... [Castro 
thought] that the U.S. would ultimately be forced to come to terms with 
Cuba when it has to deal simultaneously with ‘several’ other revolutionary 
regimes.”46 
The initial efforts to export revolution forces were countered by the U.S.’ increase in 
counter subversion methods employed in Latin America, as the Cubans proved to be 
more willing to take further risks in overt interventions than the Soviets. By 1970, the 
first wave of Cuban-backed rural insurgencies in South America was eliminated. 
Until the defeat in South America, the internationalist mission was covert and 
decided by Castro in an ad-hoc fashion. The introduction of Cuban troops into Angola 
marked the first step of the regime pursuing overtly Cuba interests and those of the Soviet 
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Union by using the FAR as a policy instrument. Externally, this mission was made 
possible by the political and economic rapprochement between the Soviet Union and 
Cuba. Internally, it provided the FAR a test bed for its operational capabilities. 
In 1975, the introduction of Cuban troops in Angola as part of Operation Carlota 
facilitated the uprising of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). 
By 1976, 36,000 Cuban troops participated in the fighting that led to the installation of 
the MPLA as the government of the newly independent nation. The Soviet Union assisted 
in transporting Cuban troops, and provided supplies and equipment to include “MiG-23 
jet fighters and T-62 main battle tanks.”47 
After Angola, Cuba’s largest military intervention was in Ethiopia, where 
in 1978 16,000 Cuban troops helped repulse the invading Somali army. 
The operation was strictly coordinated with and supported by the Soviet 
Union. Tens of thousands of Cubans armed with Soviet weapons remained 
in Angola through the 1980s. Smaller military missions were active in the 
Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Benin. Cuban military 
instructors trained Namibian, Rhodesian, and South African guerrillas.48 
The incursion into “proletarian internationalism” came at an opportune time when 
the FAR was facing the possibility of being sidelined with obsolete missions because the 
organized opposition to the regime had vanished and external threats were unlikely. “The 
military budget frozen at 5% (of the country’s GDP) since the 1960s, experienced an 
upswing, reaching 13% in 1985.”49 Soviet supplied equipment not only modernized the 
force, but also transformed it from a defense-oriented organization into an offensive 
force. The dual command structure (domestic and international) provided opportunities 
for the promotion of military personnel to middle and top-level officers. However, most 
importantly at a global stage, the Angolan experience granted the FAR prestige by being 
a small state Army capable of projecting troops overseas and winning wars. 
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C. POPULAR MILITARIZATION 
The year 1980 marked yet another change in Cuban military missions in contrast 
to the previous decade. This period was characterized by the resurgence of popular 
militarization, which was embodied with the creation of the Territorial Troop Militia 
(MTT) and the adoption of the doctrine “War of All the People.” 
As defined by Castro, the MTT was “one more force, formed voluntarily, 
integrated by men and women, laborers, farmers, students, who were willing to fight and 
have not already been inducted into the reserve of the regular troops or into the Civil 
Defense”50 In just two years, the MTT strength amassed “30,000 officers and 500,000 
militia.”51 Interestingly, in an attempt to deconflict institutional disputes, the FAR was 
initially assigned shared responsibilities, but following its defeat in Grenada, the Ministry 
of Interior (MININT) assumed the responsibility of running the MTT, and the party was 
also given responsibilities in this area at the local levels. 
At a national level, “the Castro brothers, Juan Almeida, Osmany Cienfuegos, and 
Pedro Miret” shared the MTT leadership.52 At a local level, local and regional party 
organizations coordinated the efforts. Raul Castro frequently attributed this particular 
leadership arrangement to the PCC. He declared, “the party is the true architect of that 
decisive step toward fighting the war of the entire people as represented by the defense 
zones.”53 
From an external aspect, poor performance during the U.S. invasion of Grenada, 
decreasing Soviet military assistance, coupled with the unpopularity of the Angolan 
campaign among the anti-internationalists’ faction of the FAR, once again highlighted the 
regime’s coercion mechanism of control. The first instance was through the demotion of 
the chief of Cuban forces in Granada, Colonel Torotolo. Interestingly enough, his return 
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was celebrated with a hero’s welcome, only to be publicly demoted two months later by 
Raul Castro and sent to serve in Angola for ignoring his orders to “die fighting, 
regardless of the difficulty and the disadvantage of the circumstances.”54 
Although disaffection among the ranks is hard to judge due to the closed nature of 
the Cuban military, the defections of “Lt Col Muorino in 1984 and Brigadier General del 
Pino in 1987,”55 could be interpreted as indicators of a period of institutional discontent 
in the FAR. This period of trial culminated with the court martial and execution of “Gen. 
Arnaldo Ochoa and three fellow officers”56 on charges of corruption to make perfectly 
clear that dissent would be quickly retaliated against harshly by coercion and the 
elimination of any possible challenges from within. 
In terms of civil-military relations, the most significant event in terms of military 
political clout during this time period was also a byproduct of the Ochoa trial. As 
depicted by Armando F. Mastrapa III in his article, “Evolution, Transition and The Cuban 
Revolutionary Armed Forces,” he argues that the Ochoa trial resulted from the Ministry 
of the Interior’s (Ministerio del Interior—MININT) independence and Castro’s 
perception as a threat to his power. Thus, the FAR’s clout peaked with the resulting purge 
of disloyal officers and the exclusive consolidation of coercive power in 1989, “when the 
police, intelligence, and security services of the Ministry of Interior came under their 
control.”57 
The 1980s culminated with the U.S.-brokered return of Cuban troops from 
Angola, the incorporation of western business practices into military industries, which 
was a by-product of Cuba’s inability to secure foreign loans, and yet, another shift of the 
military’s mission into a domestic role. This shift began in 1987 with “Plan Turquino,”58 
as it was designed to improve living conditions and economics prospects in the rural 
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mountainside that comprise “Guaniguanico, Escambray, Sierra Maestra and Macizo 
Nipe-Sagua-Baracoa”59 while it also continued with the militarization of domestic 
economy industries (tourism included) to raise revenue for the state. “Civilian and 
military elites and functional specialization was, once again, blurred because of the armed 
forces enhanced role in the economy, party, bureaucracy, and state augmented by the 
leadership’s reorganization and reassertion of control of the military.”60 
D. PATTERNS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
Since Cuba’s military and political development differs from all communist 
systems in which a political hegemony existed prior to the expansion of a military force, 
this thesis aims to explain the power dynamics using different explanatory models. As 
opposed to other civil-military scholars who have written about the FAR, this thesis 
analyzes both the power of the political class over the military, as well as military 
influence over the PCC.  
To examine the FAR’s influence over policy further, the framework by Dr. 
Harold A. Trinkunas is utilized to assess “the boundaries between military and civilian 
jurisdictions.”61 The areas used in this framework are characterized “by their functional 
distance from the military’s war-fighting mission and by the degree of threat to civilian 
control posed by military involvement.”62 Given that Cuba is a communist system in 
which the lines between the state, armed forces and civilians are blurred, this analysis is 
reinforced with J. Samuel Fitch’s framework to categorize patterns of civil-military 
relations from his book, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America. His 
framework measures the influence of the military over the PCC and not just the opposite. 
His approach recognizes the importance of institutional, political and international 
contexts that shape military behavior. 
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Figure 1 is utilized as the base model to illustrate the jurisdictional boundaries 
between the military and state jurisdictions represented as role areas within four 
concentric rings.  
External defense tasks involve preparing for and conducting war and 
related military missions, managing the military bureaucracy, trianing, and 
strategic planning. Internal security includes the maintenance of public 
order in emergency situations, preparation for couterinsurgency warfare , 
the gathering of domestic intelligence and policing. Public policy covers 
the state budgets, the fucntioning of government agencies and the crafting 
of public policy to achieve social welfare, development and political 
objectives. State Leadership selection involves decisions concerning the 
criteria and process by which government official are recruited, 
legitmated, and empowered.63 
 
Figure 1.   Jurisdictional Boundaries 
As described earlier in this chapter, the post-revolutionary structural foundation of 
the FAR set the conditions for its exceptional political power dynamics. The absence of a 
party dominant structure led to the fusion of the guerilla elites into the de-facto political 
class in what could be defined using Juan J. Linz’s typology from the book, Totalitarian 
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and Authoritarian Regimes, initially as an “interim crisis government”64 that imposed its 
rulership based on “a mixture of fear and rewards to its collaborators”65 resembling a 
“sultanistic dictatorship.” This transitional period resulted in the consolidation of a 
“political system resulting from the importance of ideology, the tendency toward a 
monistic center of power and the emphasis on mass participation and mobilization,”66 
much like a “totalitarian party.” 
Figure 2 illustrates the dynamics during the post-revolutionary period. During this 
time, the FAR was directly involved in external defense during the Bay of Pigs invasion, 
internal defense in its mission against insurrectionary bands in the Escambray Mountains, 
and assumed socio-economic missions that granted a shared jurisdiction over policy, such 
as the sugar industry. Since both Castro brothers wore uniforms and fulfilled 
commanding capacities over the military at the time, and the PCC had yet to consolidate, 
this period could be categorized as militarily controlled—defined by the “de-facto 
political subordination of nominally civilian governments to effective military control.”67 
It is also important to mention that during this period, the foundation of the FAR 
institutional cohesion was developed by formalizing indoctrination, defining the Cuban 
communist ideology, overlapping responsibilities between the state and the military, and 
most importantly, through cycles of rewards for loyalty and severe punishment for 
dissent. 
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Figure 2.   Post-Revolutionary Period 
Figure 3 illustrates the jurisdictional withdrawal that occurred during the 
professionalization period. The specialization, training and equipment transformation of 
the FAR that led to the internationalist incursions in Africa could be categorized as 
“conditional military subordination” in which “under normal circumstances the armed 
forces abstain from overt intervention in political questions. Notwithstanding, the military 
reserves its “right” to intervene to protect national interests and guarantee national 
security in times of crisis.”68 The decisions made by the top three (Fidel, Raul and Che) 
with respect to the internationalist commitment could be interpreted as state policy while 
the operational decisions over the employment of such forces by the FAR leadership 
corresponded to its limited influence. 
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Figure 3.   Profesionalization Period 
The popular militarization period representation was deliberately omitted, as it 
was a transitional period of jurisdictional expansion. The peak of the FAR as a 
professional force gave way to a steep decline in military capacity but resurgence of 
economic and political responsibilities propelled by a failing economy, curtailment of 
Soviet support and the regime’s survival efforts. The civil-military relations in play 
during the FAR expansion into the economy are covered in the next chapter as it 
addresses the strategies used to compensate for the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
 23
III. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE 
COLLAPSE OF THE PARTY-STATE SOCIALISM IN EASTERN 
EUROPE (SPECIAL PERIOD) 
In the 1990s, as the Soviet Union collapsed, Cuba was forced to re-evaluate its 
economic model in a period that Fidel Castro called a “special period in time of peace.”69 
During this period, the country’s main supporter (the Soviet Union) cut off external aid 
and the inefficiencies of the centrally planned economy gave way to the FAR’s 
employment of Western-styled business improvement models to tackle the crisis. The 
macro-economic pressure along with the strategic formulation of the regime’s leadership 
transformed the FAR from competent combat force to something more in line with an 
entrepreneurial megacorporation. Although by law, the mission70 of the FAR continued 
to be the protector of the state,71 the reality is that the FAR’s mission transitioned to 
employment in a variety of domestic purposes in response to the domestic economic 
crisis. No longer a warfighter,72 or arguably a defender73 by capacity, the FAR has 
changed their mission to assist in the regime’s survival through re-insertion into the 
domestic economy that included involvement in the agriculture, manufacturing and 
service sectors. 
By 1992, as Cuba faced a “suspensions of oil deliveries, the collapse of 
trade,…and a 40–45% decline in GDP,”74 the FAR also endured significant changes that 
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included budget cuts, personnel cutbacks, curtailed equipment and training. The Soviet 
economic collapse directly affected the FAR by eliminating “$16–19 billion in military 
assistance.”75 Cuban fiduciary budget cuts reduced the FAR’s budget from $2.2 billion in 
1988 to $1.35 billion three years later. As a whole, the FAR’s expenditures declined from 
“13 percent of the national budget in the mid 1980s…to less than 1.6 percent in 1995.”76 
Furthermore, the armed forces also lost half of its forces through cutbacks, retirements 
and reduced conscription terms during this period; troop strength was reduced from 
“108,500 in 1990 to…55,000 in 2000.”77  
The FAR’s strategy in response to reductions was implementing an “intensive 
conservation effort undertaken for a wholly autarkic existence…conserving existing 
material and equipment, which along with self sufficiency and defense readiness is one of 
the FAR’s three main goals.”78 This so-called “zero option” was enabled by the 
management initiatives implemented by Raul Castro in the mid-1980s. FAR officers were 
sent to Europe to study western business methods, techniques of economic management 
and production. The sistema de perfeccionamiento empresarial (SPE) was tested at the 
“Empresa Militar Comandante Ernesto Che Guevara,”79 later expanded to “more than 
200 factories of the Unión de la Industria Militar (UIM)”80 and by 1998, under Fidel’s 
direction, 3,000 state non-military enterprises applied the model. 
When analyzing the FAR’s combat readiness during the special period, it is 
important to notice the significant degradation in the curtailment of aviation, armor, 
artillery and mechanized training. The lack of fuel and spare parts increased downtime, 
while it fostered cannibalization and mothballing of equipment. This lack of resources 
was not mitigated through cost-cutting adjustments; hence, resulting in degradation of 
training and preparedness limited to rudimentary infantry skills.  
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The downgrade in warfighting capacity during the special period raises the 
following question: What were the effects of the FAR’s alternative functions during the 
“special period” on its political power? To address this issue, it is necessary to consider 
the strategies implemented and their effects. “Among these were the “dollarization” of 
the economy, the search for foreign capital and the creation of numerous joint venture 
companies (many of them run by officers of the FAR).”81 The joint ventures formed 
niches of sheltered capitalism that along with the dependence on remittances from 
overseas Cubans magnified social cleavages based on access to dollars and resources. 
These measures helped the regime survive and reinforced loyalty to the ruling coalition. 
Therefore, even as the military operational capacity of the FAR degenerated over the 
years, its cohesion as an institution and to the regime was co-opted by access to 
resources. However, this will be articulated in the next chapter as it explains in depth the 
militarization of the Cuban economy. 
A. EFFECTS OF “DOWNSIZING” 
Facing the challenge of readiness degradation and end strength reduction, the 
FAR focused on becoming self-sufficient while maintaining a defensive capacity. The 
challenge was effectively mitigated through the implementation of SPE management 
procedures and the state’s delegation on the FAR to establish joint venture companies 
with foreign investors. “Since the collapse of Soviet subsidies in the early 1990s, 
business managed by the Cuban armed forces has grown to account for over three 
quarters of export earnings.”82 By 2001:  
Over 300 enterprises associated with the FAR…account for nearly 90 
percent of Cuban exports, nearly 60 percent of tourism earnings, and 
employed 20 percent of state workers. The most important of the FAR 
enterprises was the holding company GAESA whose subsidiaries (among 
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nearly 400 tiendas de recaudacion de divisas catering to foreigners or 
Cubans with dollars or euros), and are involved in aviation, mining and the 
citrus industry.83 
The FAR’s current domestic mission expansion is reflected in the portfolio of 
state institutions it effectively controls: the Ministry of Sugar Industry, National State 
Reserve Institute, Ministry of Fisheries and Merchant Marine, Ministry of Transport and 
Ports, Cuban Civil Aviation Corporation Inc., National Institute of State Reserves, 
Ministry of Information Technology and Communications, Grupo Electrónica de Cuba, 
which includes COPEXTEL telecoms, Cuban Civil Aviation Corporation, Habanos, S.A. 
(tobacco products), Gaviota Inc. (tourist enterprise), Metropolitan Bank, GeoCuba 
Entrepreneurial Group (land concessions and leases), TECNOTEC (high-tech 
importer/exporter), Industrial Military Union (12 major industries, 16 factories, 230 
facilities), Plan-Turquino-Manati (a funded developmental plan covering 20 
municipalities), Plan for Entrepreneurial Redesign, CIMEX (import/export, free-trade 
zones, tourism, transportation, digital communications equipment, car rentals and 
audiovisual publicity), CUBANA-CAN (similar to CIMEX), Citrus (agricultural and 
industrial processing), State Commission for Entrepreneurial Perfection, and Ideological 
Department of the Central Committee.84 
Ironically, the FAR has become a vanguard institution of economic liberalization 
measures, especially in the area of foreign investment driven business management. The 
sheer proportionality of institutions led by the FAR is indicative of the centrality of its 
role and follows the trend proposed by Victoria M. Murillo in “Political Bias in Policy 
Convergence: Privatization Choices in Latin America.” The paper argues that economic 
nationalism85 and political bias86 influence the selection of regulations at the time of 
privatization. Since Cuba is a country that fosters high economic nationalism, 
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“privatization was more likely to include restrictions on foreign ownership and 
management”87 therefore “preferential access was given to certain actors who can be 
traced to the community of the government coalition.”88 The FAR’s involvement in the 
joint venture companies entailed the brokerage of deals with foreign companies, 
administration of projects and market search for Cuban exports; this role in turn gave 
FAR officers a privileged position as liaisons for foreign capital. 
While the armed forces’ involvement in civilian enterprises was an avenue for job 
creation and a source of privileges for its officers during the economic crisis, it has not 
been troublefree. In addition to the warfighting capacity and readiness degradation 
mentioned previously, Hal Klepak brings attention to two problematic trends, in his book 
Cuba’s Military 1990–2005: Revolutionary Soldiers During Counter-Revolutionary 
Times, the growth of corruption and junior officer dissapointment. Klepak argues that the 
FAR’s economic reforms while it improved its performance as an institution first, the 
later management of civilian state enterprises, and subsequent creation of new hybrid 
enterprises in which the state remains the shareholder has allowed for corruption among 
the ranks and a growing gap between junior and senior officers. The first trend has been 
adressed by the regime as arrests and removals after investigations have showed 
examples of wrongdoing, but in spite of harsh sentences, it continues to be a problem. 
Furthermore, Klepak assess that the admiration from the public at large towards the FAR 
has evolved into resentment to what is percieved as privilege by normal Cubans. The 
second trend corresponds to the generation of officers who have joined during a special 
period over 20 years in length with aspirations of prestige. This latter group now faces 
“curtailed training possibilities, restricted promotions linked to fewer activities abroad 
and cuts in strenght at home, much reduced potential for interesting postings…real life in 
the forces can prove much less attractive than many thought when they joined or indeed 
even experienced earlier on their careers.”89 
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In summary, the strategies addressing the “special period” have shifted the FAR’s 
role to a centric position within the domestic economy. This trend will be clear by 
examining two important economy sectors in the following chapter and the project used 
towards its economic liberalization known as perfeccionamiento empresarial in the next 
section.  
B. PERFECCIONAMIENTO EMPRESARIAL 
To understand the current dynamics of reforms and the implications to the FAR, it 
is first necessary to comprehend the “official policy to guide the full restructuring of the 
Cuban state economic system,”90 better known as perfeccionamiento empresarial and its 
dynamics in terms of political power. This section also explores the objectives and 
enabling conditions that allowed for the transfer of these managerial and organizational 
methods to sectors of the civilian economy. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the perfeccionamiento empresarial was 
initially a Cuban military business improvement model applied to the Military Industries 
Union with the intent of mitigating the reduction in resources while maintaining repairs 
for its air, land and naval weapons systems. This blueprint was later expanded to 
pharmaceutical, biotechnology and sugar sectors within the UIM. By 1994, “the Military 
Industries Union produced 58 million pesos worth of goods, striving to achieve the 
principle of financial self-sufficiency.”91 That same year, with Fidel Castro’s 
endorsement, Raul Castro’s project (perfeccionamiento empresarial) gained the legal 
structure to expand to the civilian sectors under “Law Number 75 of National Defense,”92 
which tasked the FAR with recovery assistance that consisted of the following.  
 Feeding themselves and part of the population in its regular or 
national service components 
 Earning foreign exchange through activities it was especially well-
suited to perform and which could be used for military or other 
purposes for which the state had the need 
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 Maintaining emergency services in conjunction with the Ministry 
of the Interior, to be reinforced by the military, especially after the 
“Habanazo” riots of August 1994, and in line with the search and 
rescue and disaster relief duties of long standing 
 Placing emphasis on those roles required by Cuban foreign policy 
as a result of the real need to reduce points of friction with the 
United States, especially in the fields of illegal immigration control 
and antinarcotics operations93 
Interestingly, and in contrast to all previous policy reforms, while Fidel was the 
Commander in Chief, for the first time, the push for policy reform did not come from him 
but from the Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Raul Castro). In the past, 
advocates for economic change had been dismissed by the Politburo, and what is more 
significant was that Fidel was not in favor of this model even as he faced enormous 
economic pressure. In the end, he conceded to Raul’s plan and the FAR economic team’s 
recommendation as it would allow “him to reaffirm the place and the role of the FAR as 
the leading institution in the field of reforms and by doing this he remains very much in 
control of the pace and modalities of the reform process.”94 
Although Domingo Amuchastegui argues that such expansion does not translate 
to militarization of the economy because the “language (used) is of costs and benefits of 
necessary lay-offs, of responding to market demands and mathematical models, and 
relying on principles of financial engineering and computerized systems and complex 
telecommunications, not in giving orders or resorting to extra-economic coercion.”95 On 
the other hand, the main instrument of this economic and institutional restructuring has 
been the manu militari, from the EJT’s and MTT’s augmentation in agricultural tasks to 
feed the armed forces, to the management of tourism, banking and commerce by officers 
of the FAR; the scope, magnitude and complexity points towards militarization. The 
current trend takes this process beyond the survival and recovery objectives and can be 
interpreted as an institutional continuity instrument given that as of 1996, the MINFAR 
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has been “able to self finance more than 50 percent of its expenses…while providing 
foodstuffs and jobs to its rank and file”96 and by “June 2000–1,419… enterprises were 
already involved in the early stages of perfeccionamiento.”97 
When considering the increasing number of officers who have demonstrated 
loyalty to Raul Castro have been appointed to key government, economic and party posts 
while he was the Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces and his success in 
promoting policy that expanded perfeccionamiento empresarial to domestic enterprises, 
is it evident why Frank Mora catalogues this period as the rise of Raulismo. In his article, 
“The Far and its Economic Role: From Civic to Technocrat-Soldier,” he defines it as the 
“process by which Raul Castro enhanced his role and that of the institution he commands 
in sectors deemed critical for the regime during the Special Period, helping him to 
strengthen and consolidate his position and that of the FAR in society and consequently, 
in a post-Fidel transition.”98 Regardless of how the SPE policy concession evolved, it is 
clear that a transition in the institutional power of the FAR occurred just as its mission 
changed during the special period and it merits analysis within the framework of civil-
military relations. 
C. PATTERN OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
Even though the mission set for the FAR seems to shift every decade or so 
(beginning in 1960), the special period (from 1991) marks a milestone in terms of civil-
military relations as the establishment of a mission model that can be used to explain the 
current developments. This section interprets the FAR’s incursion into the domestic 
economy using the “developmentalist model” proposed by J. Samuel Fitch. His “military 
tutelage” definition is used to describe how this mission shift differs from the previous 
“Fidel” centric policy changes. Deborah Norden’s article, “Civilian Authority Without 
Civilian Dominance?” illustrates how untraditional roles affirm the value of the armed  
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forces within the government policy agenda, and finally, Kristina Mani’s article, 
“Militaries in Business: State-Making and Entrepreneurship in the Developing World,” is 
used to determine how this military economic enclave functions. 
The developmentalist model described by Fitch attributes the proliferation of non-
military activities to the need of the military to “develop their own resouces.”99 This 
model also attributes the lack of differentiation between “military, paramilitary and police 
functions”100 as causal for the accumulation of non-military missions. In Cuba, however, 
the police and military functions were clearly defined and the latter has never expanded 
into domestic law enforcement or dissent repression for that matter. The bluriness of 
identity as in most “socialist” systems lies between civil society, the armed forces and 
state and this founding condition just as well facilitates the military iniative of expanding 
missions as a response to crisis. Furthermore, for the first time since the period of the 
FAR’s intitutional foundation, the military took the lead in public policy formulation. 
This change can be confirmed by Raul Castro’s role as Minister of the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces as descibed by Frank O. Mora: 
Vice-Presindent Carlos Lage, a top economic official said …the economic 
reforms had been “strongly pushed by Raul with the support of Fidel.” 
Raul was mentioned repaetedly in the press or by high government, party 
or military officials as the “architect,” “father,” or “brains behind Cuba’s 
effort to save the revolution from economic crisis. 101 
Figure 4 illustrates the jurisdictional expansion that occurred during the special 
period. The centrality of the military crafting domestic economic policy along with the 
FAR’s role in key economic sectors can be defined as “military tutelage” in which “the 
armed forces participate in the policy process and exercise oversight over civilian”102 (or 
in this case, the communist party) authority. 
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Figure 4.   Special Period 
In a democratic regime, it would be safe to assert that having the military take the 
lead in policy is one short step from a coup in terms of civilain control. The post-
authoritarian nature of Cuba dictates a different set of conditions; therefore, using Mani’s 
framework, “the level of state capacity, the nature of military organization,…and how 
these (military economic) enclaves function”103 must be considered to determine who 
controls the process and who is served by the gains. This framework confirms that the 
lack of state capacity in terms of “guiding and controlling the military behavior”104 
increases the likelihood of military entrepreneurship while the “professional” character of 
the FAR’s military organization ensures those gains are destined for institutional benefit 
and not individual gain. The term “professionalism” in this particular case refers to 
Huntington’s formula of a military that is “trained and organized to possess specially 
learned skills designed to protect the state and nation, generating a sense of in-group 
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identity.”105 Having defined the civil-military relations model of the special period, the 
conditions that lead to this enclave building, and the likely destiny for the resource gains, 
it is also important to consider the political significance of the mission expansion beyond 
an expansion of the resource base. 
The FAR’s current independence from this political society (communist party) for 
resouces raises issues of political effectiveness over the ability of the regime to establish 
authority over the armed forces. However, beyond Huntington’s definiton of “subjective 
control,”106 the Castros have set in place a system in which the military is not just 
integrated into the administration, and therefore, an active participant in the government’s 
policies by sharing a political-military agenda but it also adds to the system of incentives 
by providing the FAR officers protection from the effects of the economic crisis. 
Borrowing from Deborah Norden’s article, “Civilian Authority Without Civilian 
Dominance?”, it can be deduced that untraditional roles affirm the value of the armed 
forces within the government policy agenda. The FAR’s expansion of untraditional roles 
have not only created a “shared political-military agenda, and therefore enhanced the 
government’s authority over the armed forces;”107 it also has ensured its budget while 
maintianing the FAR officers’ standards of living, and hence, boosting military loyalty. 
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IV. MILITARIZATION OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY 
From the period following the suppression of the insurgency in the Escambray 
Mountains (1965), the FAR has assumed non-defense related missions. The process of 
militarization of the Cuban economy, which originated with an increase in the labor 
supply dedicated to the sugar harvest in the late 1960s, has evolved into entrepreneurship 
sponsored by the limited market-oriented reforms that has granted them centrality within 
today’s Cuban economy. Cuba’s armed forces have pursued military and economic 
missions simultaneously; this chapter aims to capture the adaptability to non-traditional 
missions by analyzing their involvement in the sugar, and later, in the tourism industries. 
Finally, the implications of these missions are placed in context by exploring the FAR’s 
power dynamics with other political institutions and resulting patterns of civil-military 
relations.  
A. SUGAR INDUSTRY 
Throughout Cuba’s history, the economic condition of the island has been closely 
associated with the sugar industry. The share of land dedicated to its cultivation and 
amount of employment generated by the industry commands centrality in Cuba’s 
economic environment. As illustrated by Perez-Lopez: 
Sugar was the engine that powered the Cuban economy. Sugar Production 
was the main industrial activity, the main generator of foreign exchange, 
and the largest single employer in the nation…When the international 
market price was high, the island experienced a period of economic 
prosperity referred to as vacas gordas (fat cows), this was followed by 
prolonged periods of low sugar prices and vacas flacas (thin cows).108 
Given the importance of the sugar industry, it is only logical that the central institution of 
the regime (FAR) became involved in one way, or another, with this enterprise. 
As early as 1963, when compulsory military service was being considered, Raul 
Castro proposed the FAR’s entry into this industry as a way to compensate for the 
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military’s burden on the economy. He proposed, “that the armed forces should help in the 
nation’s economy…[we intend to make] the burden of military expenditures on our 
people a bit lighter, in other words, we must work as part of our service, especially in the 
sugar harvest.”109 
From the beginning of the FAR’s augmentation into the sugar industry in 1968 to 
1971, the number of FAR soldiers assigned to sugar harvest fluctuated from “38,000 (in 
1969 to) 70,000 (in 1970 while proportionally ranging from) 35 to 64”110 percent of the 
regular armed forces. In contrast to similar employment during the Batista regime, for the 
first time, soldiers assumed technical and managerial positions in addition to labor 
augmentation. The FAR’s involvement ranged from the Air Force using airplanes to 
spray fertilizers on the fields, the military supervision and operation of farm machinery, 
transportation management tasks, to the building of roads, railroad tracks and temporary 
housing all the while maintaining military organization and chain of command. 
The soldier’s combined efforts during the FAR’s initial entry into the sugar 
harvest can be attributed with the cutting of up “20 percent of the sugar cane harvest.”111 
Coincidently, and in spite of political opposition by 1968, the military expenditures 
allocation of the national budget rose also “20 percent.”112 Interestingly, this was the 
largest increase in the defense budget in over 10 years; the budget growth was 
disproportionate to the growth of the Cuban economy, and overall, the FAR did not prove 
to be more efficient than civilians involved in the sugar harvest.  
In the early 1970s, as the FAR aimed at professionalization in preparation for the 
internationalist role, the re-assertion of military tasks gave way to the creation of the 
Youth Labor Army (Ejército Juvenil del Trabajo—EJT).  As stated by Dominguez, “this 
army (was) specialized in production, when these tasks (were) completed, or if they are 
only seasonal, the members of the Army of Working Youth are expected to prepare for 
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combat.”113 Although the EJT’s level of combat readiness remains questionable, its 
compensation for workforce shortages allowed the FAR to focus on military tasks, and 
for a while (until the special period), devolved production tasks back to civilians.  
Two decades later, the dramatic reductions in the FAR’s budget during the special 
period occurred to be followed by numerous unsuccessful sugarcane harvests between 
1991 and 1995 caused by a scarcity of fuel and spare parts. These conditions promoted 
the initial re-insertion of the FAR into the Cuban economy with the replacement of the 
Minister of Sugar in 1997 with “General Ulises Rosales del Toro.”114 
The nomination of General Rosales del Toro is relevant in many ways. He is 
considered the architect of the popular militarization also known as the “War of All the 
People.” He was the “highest ranking officer in Cuba to study business management 
abroad during the initial phase of the perfeccionamiento empresarial”115 and he is a 
member of Raul Castro’s inner circle. 
In spite of all General Rosales del Toro’s accomplishments and management 
measures (to include the closing of sugar mills in 2002), the sugar harvest decline has 
continued until today. Immediately upon his tenure, in “1997 and 1998 harvests, total 
production was between 3.1 and 3.2 million metric tons, while exports are believed to 
have reached 2.4 million tons. For the 1998/1999 harvest, the Cuban government 
(reported a) production in the order of 3.6 million tons.”116 By way of comparison and 
highlighting the production decline, “in 1990, Cuba produced 8.4 tons of sugar while in 
2010 it produced just 1.5 tons,”117 the lowest in over 50 years. 
Notwithstanding the downturn of the sugar industry in today’s Cuban economy, it 
continues to be an important sector of the Cuban economy and the FAR’s re-expansion of 
missions. 
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The sugar industry employs directly about one-tenth of the labor force and 
indirectly supports about one half of all workers. The domestic value-
added associated with sugar production and production of sugar 
derivatives is much higher than that for other current alternatives (such as 
tourism).118 
Tourism, on the other hand, is the most profitable enterprise in the FAR’s current 
portfolio. 
B. TOURISM INDUSTRY 
In the early 1990s, as the FAR expanded its economic reach beyond the UIM, 
tourism became the most profitable venture of all the sectors explored. These enterprise-
tailored services catering to international tourism were organized under the Grupo de 
Administracion Empresarial (GAESA) with the name of Gaviota Tourism Group. 
Gaviota operates and controls the following enterprises: Hoteles Gaviota, 
Gaviota Tour, Arcoiris, Marinas Gaviota, Via (auto rentals), Transgaviota 
(helicopter and small aircraft rentals), Tiendas Gaviota, Parques Naturales 
Gaviota, Inversiones Gaviota and Commercial Gaviota.119 
General Luis Perez Rospide, previous head of the UIM and close associate of Raul 
Castro, managed this conglomerate of 10 enterprises. It is estimated that the FAR tourism 
enterprises “manage nearly 20 percent of Cuba’s total tourism trade,”120 generating in 
turn, “30 percent of all military expenditures while providing employment to 25 percent 
of demobilized troops.”121 Gaviota has provided self-sufficiency to the FAR as its 
government funding decreased, all the while becoming one of the largest foreign 
exchange earners in Cuba after sugar. 
In addition to an already significant command over the tourism sector, Gaviota 
has established a number of subsidiaries administrated by GAESA. Among them are a 
company for the importation and exportation of products named Tecnotex, agriculture 
and cattle businesses named Agrotex, as well as real estate, construction and shipyard 
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services. Lastly, but perhaps just as important, are the Tiendas para la Recaudación de 
Divisas—TRD (Shops for the Collection of Foreign Currency). Formerly a store that 
carried expensive imported goods for a tourist clientele, TRD has evolved into an 
enterprise in which Cuban consumers who have remittances dollars or Euros can 
purchase convenience items otherwise not available. According to Klepak, this enterprise 
also constitutes an important perk for the FAR as “officers, and sometimes other ranks as 
well, can expect to have occasional direct access to refrigerators, televisions, air 
conditioners, and other modern appliances and conveniences, … on a basis of purchase in 
moneda nacional.”122 
With “2.53 million tourists (visiting) Cuba in 2010,”123 it is easy to assess that the 
economic impact of military enterprises in Cuba is enormous. According to Latell, it is 
estimated that the FAR’s economic contributions are “89 percent of the exports, 59 
percent of tourism revenue, 24 percent of productive service income, 60 percent of hard 
currency wholesale transactions, 66 percent of hard currency retail sales and employ 20 
percent of state workers.”124 When all subsidiaries and economic activities under the 
GAESA umbrella are included, “it is estimated that the military controls more than 60 
percent of Cuba’s economy.”125 
1. Budget Changes 
Beneath the enormous proportion of the Cuban economy controlled by the 
military, it is important to analyze how this expansion affects the FAR as an institution, 
which can be done in terms of budget changes. As the special period significantly 
reduced the FAR’s budget, the militarization of economic sectors has compensated by 
generating revenue. 
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By 1994 MINFAR was able to compensate for its dramatic loss of state 
allotted resources; it spent only 37% of its 1980s budgets. In 1995 the 
FAR self-financed 30% of its expenses, and 32% of its production was 
destined for the island’s civilian economic sectors. In 1996 Gaviota’s total 
earning was US$525 million, representing nearly a fifth of the country’s 
total hard currency earnings. Also, more than 75% of all repairs and spare 
parts for civilian industries came from military enterprises.126 
Table 1 illustrates how the military enterprises generate revenue in proportions 
that have more than doubled the average budget for defense and internal order, from the 
special period to the present. It can be observed that an inversely proportional trend exists 
in the FAR concerning budget decreases with the expansion of the economy role.  
 
 
Table 1.   Evolution of the Defence and Internal Order Budget (From 127) 
The FAR’s capitalization of the regime’s economic strategy is but one of two 
aspects that lead to institutional dominance. The other aspect is the FAR’s political 
power. The next section analyzes the armed forces’ political influence stability and the 
dynamics with other political institutions. 
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C. FAR POWER DYNAMICS WITH OTHER POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 
From the FAR’s beginnings, military officers have served among the highest 
positions of the Communist Party. They have represented the military’s interest in the 
party while some traced their association back to the revolution when they fought in Raul 
Castro’s forces. In this post-totalitarian phase of the regime, it is important to assess the 
armed forces’ participation in the Cuban political framework as it directly relates to the 
regime’s stability and cohesion. 
Different from other civil-military analysis on Cuba, which has focused on the 
relations of the Communist Party over the FAR, the approach in this thesis is to analyze 
the political power of the FAR through its development to the present. Since the FAR’s 
founding condition established the regime’s top hierarchy in the period immediately 
following the revolution, in a sense, Fidel, Raul and Che can be attributed to establishing 
the foundation of the FAR’s participation in the political framework. More importantly, 
the FAR had a political mission from its inception that ranged from indoctrination of its 
own, the “absorption of the structure of the Communist party,”128 the prevention of 
cleavages and the development of civilian cadres.  Commanders in the FAR were not just 
managers and technicians but fulfilled political roles as well.   
In the early 1960s, the pre-revolutionary Communists aimed at controlling the 
FAR through political instructors but this process evolved into the military’s penetration 
of the party just as the party had penetrated the armed forces. From 1970 to 1976, the 
percentage of FAR officers who were either Communist party members or belonged to 
the Communist Youth Union, rose from “69.6 percent…(to) 86 percent.”129 This increase 
was followed by a steep decline in the FAR’s political participation during the 
internationalist period of the late 1970s to the early 1980s and a renewed expansion 
during the strategic realignment towards the end of the internationalist period. As 
illustrated by Juan M. del Aguila: 
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27 percent of the 225 members of the Communist Party’s Central 
Committee’ s elected for the 1981–1986 period came from either the 
regular armed forces (MINFAR) or from the Ministry of the Interior 
(MININT). Incidentally, FAR Division General Abelardo Colome was 
placed in charged of MININT in 1989 during a time of internal turmoil, 
scandals, and the execution of Division General Arnaldo Ochoa and three 
other officers. Placing the FAR’s second-highest ranking officer in charge 
of internal security and domestic intelligence means that the FAR is in 
charge of maintaining internal order, even if formally MININT has that 
responsibility.130 
The purge of government officials in 1989 and realignment of the Ministry of the 
Interior (MININT) under the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR) 
increased their political power by providing control of the coercion hierarchy. Therefore, 
using Felipe Aguero’s view on prerogatives, these conditions could constrain transitional 
political action not aligned with the interests of the “key actors” who first created the 
“rules of the game.” Aguero also proposes, “strategic interactions with unanticipated 
consequences are still possible, and the way these interactions evolve depends not only 
on interests but on comparative strength of the resources competitors for power can bring 
to the table.”131 
By the end of the Fourth Party Congress in 1991 military representation in 
the Central Committee reached its lowest level at 12.5 percent…(on the 
other hand), representation of key officers in the Central Committee 
increased… to 17.4 percent after the Fifth Party Congress in 1997…By the 
end of the 1997 Party Congress, the total number of military officers in the 
Politburo was five out of 24, the highest percentage since 1975.132 
The 1990s also marked a milestone in terms of political significance; the Fourth 
Congress was remarkable not just in restructuring actions (MININT realignment under 
the MINFAR) but also in terms of key political figures. The crisis of the special period 
served as the background for significant changes as “only 8 of the 14 members from the 
previous Politburo were re-elected; more than two thirds of the Central Committee was 
new; the Secretariat was abolished; half of the Central Committee departments were 
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eliminated; and 50 percent of the party was slashed.”133 However, in terms of the FAR’s 
political influence, the significance is tied to the inclusion of “four senior FAR officers—
Generals Abelardo Colome, Ulises Rosales del Toro, Julio Casas Regueiro, and Leopoldo 
Cintra Frias”134 in the new Politburo.  
The importance of the generals being included in the Politburo following the 
Fourth Congress of 1991 was not just the wide array of functions within the FAR but also 
the career trajectory that followed. General Colome Ibarra has continued to serve as the 
Minister of Interior since 1989. General Casas Regueiro served as MINFAR Vice Prime 
Minister, founder/CEO of GAESA, and in 2008, replaced Raul Castro as the Minister of 
the Revolutionary Forces until his death in September 2011. General Cintra Frias was the 
head of the Western Army who later replaced General Casas Regueiro in November 2011 
as the Minister of the Revolutionary Forces. General Rosales del Toro served as Chief of 
General Staff of the Armed Forces, Minister of Sugar (1997), Minister of Agriculture and 
now serves as the Vice-President of the Council of Ministers. This group of high-ranking 
officers cement the FAR’s loyalty to Raul Castro at the highest echelons of leadership 
following his transition to Commander in Chief in 2008. Today, the FAR maintains its 
political dominance by commanding 14 positions in the Politburo Central Committee and 
fulfilling 10 of the 38 positions in the Council of Ministers (the state’s top executive and 
administrative body). 
In summary, the FAR’s political mission has prevented friction between the 
Communist Party and the military. The establishment of conditions has ensured 
commanding political participation (although not altogether dominance) while the 
fluctuations in political participation (with increases during periods of untraditional 
missions) most likely hindered transitional political action. Jorge I Dominguez, as early 
as 1978, articulated this relationship well by stating, “In Cuba the militarization of the 
political instructors, the willing acceptance of political norms, roles and structures by 
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military officers; the unified leadership that has preserved a single preserved a single 
military chain of command; the self containment of the party within the military to 
preserve the institutional autonomy of the armed forces; and the presence of civic soldiers 
at the core of the ruling elite in charge of civilian and military organizations have 
combined to prevent …conflicts.”135 
A potential problem of this post-authoritarian dynamic is that in the event of a 
collapse precipitated by crisis, the transition delineates a path in which “the successor 
regime is likely to be authoritarian or controlled by leaders emerging out of the previous 
regime.”136 In any post-Castro scenario, the FAR’s influence raises questions of what 
would be the dynamics of the transitional government and the military. Of particular 
concern is whether the FAR will overpower a transitional government into maintaining 
the economic and authoritarian nature of the state. 
D. PATTERN OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
This chapter reviewed the FAR’s current centrality in the regime both 
economically and politically. When analyzing the current pattern of civil-military 
relations, it is important to trace the FAR’s political power dynamics, as well as its 
evolution into entrepreneurship.  
The combined insertion of the FAR into the top two Cuban economic sectors 
(sugar and tourism) has transcended regime survival strategies. The FAR has also 
evolved into an institutional continuity instrument, which is evidenced by the capacity to 
self finance over half of the military expenses since 1996 and the generation of revenue 
that has doubled the budget for defense and internal order during the latter half of the 
special period. 
Table 2 illustrates comparative increases in the defense and internal order budget, 
government budget and Cuba’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The table reflects an 
increase in the defense and internal order budget of 100 percent between 2001 and 2010 
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that closely corresponds to Cuba’s increase in GDP. This increase can be attributed to the 
FAR’s expansion into the Cuban domestic economy. However, the FAR’s capitalization 
of the regime’s economic strategy can only attest to the FAR’s adaptability to 
untraditional missions, as well as flexibility towards budget curtailments while it also has 
been a co-optation tool for Castro’s regime.   
 
Table 2.   Comparative Budget Increase (From 137) 
In addition to the FAR’s economic expansion, to better understand current Cuban 
civil-military relations, it is also essential to consider the armed forces’ political influence 
and the FAR’s dynamics with other political institutions. The previous relationship must 
be explored given that: 
Cuban military (do not)…exercise discretional decision making authority 
over reserved areas of specialization and action. When a high-rank officer 
is appointed to a civil function, his responsibility and authority cease to 
respond to the FAR or to specific military interests. Finally, service men 
do not invest personal assets in private sector undertakings, as nationals’ 
investment in private business is illegal in the isle.138 
The FAR’s origin for its political mission can be attributed to the refinement and 
absorption of the Communist Party doctrine, as well as the FAR’s penetration of the 
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Communist Party through appointments to the highest positions in the party.  Having the 
institution’s political penetration established, the subordination of the MININT under the 
MINFAR in 1989 increased its political power further by granting monopoly over the 
coercion mechanisms. A year later, the appointments of the Cuban Fourth Congress 
accounts for the strategic positioning of generals loyal to Raul Castro who were to 
become the key figures in reforms, economic expansion and the current institutional 
dominance of the FAR. 
The confirmation of Raul Castro as the president of the Council of State and 
commander in chief of the FAR on February 24, 2008, cemented at the top of the 
regime’s hierarchy the person responsible for the Cuban economic reforms of the special 
period and Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces going back to the Cuban 
Revolution. Raul’s transition to the top position in Cuba’s government has removed the 
amount of influence exerted by the FAR on the regime. The appointment of Raul’s 
military loyalists to the Politburo and other key positions (such as his son-in-law Colonel 
Luis Alberto Rodriguez Lopez-Callejas as the chief executive of GAESA along with the 
generals included in the Politburo during the Fourth Congress) has maintained, although 
at a limited level, the FAR’s influence on policy. Figure 5 illustrates this dynamic in that 
Raul’s assumption of command has maintained the jurisdictional boundaries intact but 
the military’s influence in policy is limited and indirectly prescribes to J. Samuel Fitch’s 













Figure 5.   Post-Fidel Period 
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V. CONCLUSIONS  
A. MISSION TRAJECTORY AND PRESENT SITUATION  
The transition in missions experienced by the Cuban FAR has effectively reduced 
an Army that at its heyday had an end strength of over 200,000 to just over 50,000 active 
soldiers today. All the while, this transformation has led to one of the most capable war 
fighting forces in Latin America into an entrepreneurial organization of considerable 
proportions. This conclusion seeks to explain how the mission, and organizational 
changes caused by strategic formulation or structural processes forcing the direction of 
policy have translated to current civil-military relations in Cuba. 
This FAR’s mission chronology helps to explain the founding factors and 
trajectory conditions that have granted the institutional cohesion and administrative 
capacity to overcome a drastic transformation, as well as future implications of the FAR’s 
political dimension while the country undergoes a regime change. Over the years, the 
FAR’s missions have changed in response to macro-economic and foreign policy 
pressures, as well as the priorities set by the regime leadership, but all along, the 
development and progression as an institutional actor have granted enough power to 
influence policy with varying degrees of success. The ebb and flow of the FAR’s role in 
domestic policy influence has changed in reflection of leadership transitions and mission 
posture.  
1. Post Revolution 
The period leading to Fidel Castro’s consolidation of power can be categorized as 
one in which the FAR’s missions directly responded to internal challenges. From the 
insurgency in the Escambray Mountains to the military augmentation of the sugar 
industry, the FAR’s involvement is attributed to the initial survival of the regime. 
Meanwhile, its first mission of territorial defense and internal security was also fused to 
civic responsibilities in education, land reform, justice, and law enforcement. The wide 
spectrum of jurisdictions not only provided the administrative strength but its 
pervasiveness allowed it to overcome political opposition against its allocation expansion 
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in the national budget (frozen at 5 percent since the 1960s). With external threats unlikely 
(post missile crisis) and internal opposition to the regime vanished, the FAR’s penetration 
of the PCC and subsequent professionalization of the force sat the conditions for their 
incursion into “proletarian internationalism” that in turn led to their modernization and 
offensive re-orientation. 
Besides administrative capacity and political influence, the FAR’s internal 
cohesion can also be attributed to its institutional foundation. From the strict discipline 
established during the insurrection against Batista to the introduction of political 
indoctrination, the post-revolutionary period significantly shaped the FAR’s 
preconditions for internal cohesion. This cohesion was achieved and is currently 
maintained through a combination of rewards for loyalty (such as political appointments) 
and penalties for disloyalty that range up to execution.  
The consolidation of FAR leaders at the very top of the regime’s leadership and 
the indoctrination process resulted in further military-political penetration that can also be 
traced to the foundation of the institution. The indoctrination effort served a two-fold 
purpose, the refinement of the regime’s doctrine, which in turn resulted in increased FAR 
party membership, while it also earned Fidel Castro’s confidence to direct the 
institution’s next mission change. 
2. Professionalization and Expansion into Internationalism 
With internal threats eliminated, external threats unlikely, and a failed sugar 
harvest behind them, the FAR’s incursion into “proletarian internationalism” came at an 
opportune time. The military education reform of the period contributed to the 
ideological hegemony and it also branded the FAR as an instrument of Cuban social 
mobility.  Although defense policy during this period was confined to the top three 
leaders of the regime (Fidel, Raul and Che), the mission shift served as an avenue to 
expand the military budget, promotion opportunities and as a source of prestige. 
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3. Popular Militarization 
The decreasing Soviet military assistance and domestic unpopularity of the 
internationalist campaigns and the poor performance in Grenada marked the movement 
towards popular militarization. Just as the creation of the EJT responded to the FAR exit 
strategy from agricultural tasks, the MTT was created to mitigate the FAR’s end strength 
reductions. However, the most important transition in terms of power shifts was the 
MININT subordination under the FAR, which officially granted monopoly to the 
institution over all coercion mechanisms. Another significant event of the period was the 
Ochoa trial, as it reinforced the coercion mechanism of the regime and provided a vivid 
example of what was to be expected from dissidence during the upcoming austerity. 
4. Special Period (FAR’s Domestic Dimension) 
The Soviet Union collapse during the 1990s forced Cuba into economic reforms 
that catalyzed the transition of the FAR’s mission into a variety of domestic purposes. 
Although combat readiness has degraded, the strategies employed have resulted in 
institutional self-sufficiency and arguably maintained some defensive capacity. The 
FAR’s involvement in civilian enterprises has resulted in job creation, a source of 
privilege for its service members, but more importantly, it has granted the military elite 
control of over half of the Cuban domestic economy. The FAR’s capitalization on the 
regime’s economic strategy has allowed it to compensate the loss of state allotted 
resources while it also granted institutional continuity and dominance. 
Raul Castro’s confirmation to the top position of the regime (President of the 
Council of State) in 2008 has also shifted the civil-military relations in the country from 
what could be considered military tutelage towards conditional subordination. However, 
in spite of the reduction on policy influence, the FAR’s jurisdictional boundaries still 
overlap the public policy realm while officers loyal to Raul continue to be appointed to 
key government and economic positions. Today, the FAR still enjoys political dominance 
with officers fulfilling a considerable number of the state’s top executive and 
administrative positions within the Politburo. 
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B. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS  
Ironically, and although limited, a political and economic transition has occurred 
during the rule of Raul Castro; the individual person considered to be the “hard-line 
communist ideologue.”139 The limited economic reforms initiated in 2008 have been 
aimed at creating a smaller and more efficient government and reform regulations that 
inhibit productivity.  For the purpose of this research, the recent (2009–2010) three 
reforms that have future civil-military implications are the establishment of term limits 
for the top government and party positions, “the liquidation of state enterprises with 
sustained financial loses,”140 and the “creation of special development zones for foreign 
investment.”141 
The pragmatic approach of Raul Castro has resulted in investment from a variety 
of countries, and hence, has continued to expand the economic reach of the FAR. By 
restricting who can benefit from these economic reforms, the FAR’s elite manager 
officers have continued to build their economic and political power. All the while, these 
reforms have caused little transition in political power, as it has remained in the hands of 
early revolutionary leaders. Therefore, as illustrated in Brenden M. Carbonell’s article, 
“FAR from Perfect: The Military and Corporatism,” the limitation of interests groups 
operating in society force those with privileged access to maintain the government’s 
position, and therefore, slow down societal change and perpetuate the state’s survival.   
It is clear that the FAR power elites will play a crucial role in the nation’s destiny 
beyond the Castros’ lifetime. They will either actively reshape the Cuban system or 
simply arbitrate the transition; nevertheless, the stability and cohesiveness of the 
transition depend on how the economic prerogatives attained by the institution during the 
special period are approached. 
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The limited amount of primary sources and quantitative data available about the 
FAR makes research difficult, and it also leaves many areas unexplored. At this time, the 
information gaps may be a bridge too far given the military nature of the FAR and 
perceived besieged condition of the regime.  
However, if conditions change, it would be interesting to transcend beyond the 
issue of control to issues of effectiveness and efficiency. By utilizing the framework 
proposed by Dr. Thomas C. Bruneau in his book. Patriots for Profit: Contractors and the 
Military in U.S. National Security, the FAR civil-military relations could be assessed in 
terms of “effectiveness in implementing roles and missions, and efficiency in the use of 
resources.”142  
The assessment of effectiveness can effectively gauge whether or not the FAR has 
retained a defensive capability in spite of drastic reductions. Efficiency needs to be 
addressed to determine if the revenue gained by the FAR through this joint ventures is 
actually used in accordance with the government’s intent or consent. The latter is 
particularly relevant as news continues to surface indicating that corruption has tainted 
the reforms aimed at strengthening Cuba’s socialist system. In recent months, “dozens of 
Cubans have been jailed, including former government officials and top executives of 
state companies.”143 The degree of involvement of FAR officers in activities 
counterproductive to the country’s economic problem can serve as a precondition for 
political violence and alter the institutional hierarchy altogether.   
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